In the present paper, we apply the explicit formula for Hilbert's pairing suggested by S.V. Vostokov in the late 1970s to class field theory and cryptography. We give an explicit construction of the norm group of a radical extension of a local field F . We also suggest a new public key cryptographic protocol based on the explicit Hilbert pairing.
Introduction
In the 1985 N. Koblitz and V. Miller independently (see [2] and bibliography therein) inspired by Lenstra's factoring algorithm based on elliptic curves constructed a completely new Diffie-Hellman type protocols using the group of points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field rather than the multiplicative group of a finite field. Since seminal works of N. Koblitz and V. Miller, more and more pairing-based cryptosystems have been invented. Some time earlier, I.R. Shafarevich, S.V. Vostokov, and H.Brückner initiated the study of explicit constructions in the classical class field theory, which led, above other things, to explicit formulas for Hilbert's pairing [3] . This research direction was further developed by S.V. Vostokov in the 1980s. In section 1 of the present paper, we give an explicit formula for Hilbert's pairing and list its basic properties needed in the sequel. In section 2, we apply the explicit Hilbert pairing to class field theory. In section 3, we give an explicit construction of the norm group of a radical extension of a local field F for a given set of generators of an open subgroup of finite index in the multiplicative group of a one-dimensional local field F with finite residue field of characteristic p > 0. In Sec. 4, we apply the explicit Hilbert's pairing to public key cryptography. We suggest an identity-based encryption protocol based on the explicit Hilbert pairing.
2 Hilbert symbol in a one-dimensional local field
• ℘ a maximal ideal of the ring of integers in F , • the system of multiplicative representatives in F , • U F the group of units in F , • U 1 the subgroup of principal units in U F , • T the inertia subfield in F , • O := O T the ring of integers in T , • tr the trace operator in the extension T /Q p , • ζ := ζ p n a primitive p n th root of unity in F , • e the ramification index of F ,
, 1 m n,
where σ is the Frobenius automorphism in O,
] o the ideal of series with zero constant term (additive Z pmodule),
• µ m the group of mth roots of unity.
The definition and basic properties of the Hilbert symbol
Let F contain µ m . For each α ∈ F × , we denote by σ α the corresponding automorphism of the maximal Abelian extension of F , given by local class field theory. The Hilbert symbol is the pairing
, (see [1] ). We list the basic properties of the Hilbert symbol.
4. Independence in each argument. Namely, let Eis(X) be an irreducible Eisenstein's polynomial of degree p − 1,
and let r(X) be the remainder upon dividing f (X) − 1 by the polynomial u(X). Then
Explicit form of the Hilbert symbol
For all f ∈ R and g ∈ 1 + R, we define the Artin-Hasse function and the Vostokov function (see [4, Sec.1]),
It can be proved (see [3, Proposition 1] ) that the functions l and E are inverse isomorphisms between Z p -module R and multiplicative Z p -module 1 + R, i.e.,
It is easy to prove the following two statements.
where
Now, we define a bilinear pairing γ α,β :
where θ, θ ∈ , and ε, η ∈ U 1 . We choose α(X) in the form X a θε(X), where ε(X)| X=π = ε. In the same way, we define β(X) and η(X) for β. Let p = 2. We put
It can be proved (see [3, Secs. 2 and 3] ) that the pairing γ α,β is bilinear, skewsymmetric (mod p n ), and does not dependent (mod p n ) on the choice of a prime element π. Moreover,
does not depend (mod p n ) on the choice of expansions of the elements α, β, and ζ in power series in π and has the following norm property:
In addition, for the Hilbert symbol we have an explicit formula (α, β) n = ζ trγ α,β = ζ <α,β>n .
3 The class group of a cyclic p n -extension of a one-dimensional local field 3.1 Generators of cyclic p n -extensions
In this section, we study generators of a cyclic extension F (
Proof. We have (α,
1 ) = 1, and, by the norm property of the Hilbert symbol, we have
which implies that β 1 = β 1+pk N m L/F γ, i.e., the elements β 1 and
Therefore, β 1 also generates the factor group.
Corollary 1. To find a generator of the group
, it is sufficient to consider the element α modulo F ×p .
An element ω ∈ F * is called p n -primary if the extension F ( 
Moreover, the following congruence is valid:
, and ε is a principal unit, then there is a prime element τ in F such that
, where the element c is from (7). c) If α ≡ ε (mod F * p ) and ε = 1 + aπ u + . . . , where (p, au) = 1, 1 u < pe 1 , then there is a prime element τ in F such that α ≡ 1 + aτ u (mod F * p ).
Proof. a) For any integer b prime to p, we have
Since (a, p) = 1, there is a b such that ab ≡ 1 (mod p n ). Consequently,
where τ = πε b . b) Follows from (3) and (7). c) By assumption, we have
where η = 1 + c −1 c 1 π + . . . ∈ U 1 . Since the group of principal units U 1 is the m-divisible for all m prime to p, there exists an η 1 ∈ U 1 such that η
, where τ = πη 1 .
Generators of the class group of a cyclic p n -extension of a one-dimensional local field
In this section, we prove the main result of the paper. Namely, we find an explicit form of a generator of the class group of a radical p n -extension.
, where (p, au) = 1 and 1 u < pe 1 , then the element β = 1 + bπ v , where u + v = pe 1 and tr
Proof. a) and b) follow from (6) and Lemma 2. To prove c), we use formula (4) for the Hilbert symbol. We obtain
By Proposition 1, we have
Since u + v = pe 1 , congruences (3) and (8) imply
Consequently,
(mod p) and < α, β >= tr res Φ(α, β)/s = tr (ab/c) ≡ 1 (mod p).
As a result, we see that < α, β > n ≡ 1 (mod p) and (α, β) = ζ 1+pk is a primitive p n th root of unity. From the norm property of the Hilbert symbol (1), it follow that β is a generator of the class group of F ( p n √ α) if and only if (α, β) = ζ, where ζ is a primitive p n th root of unity. This proves the theorem.
Protocol authentication without disclosure
In this section, we use the explicit reciprocity law to describe a variant of a cryptographic protocol. The proof of security of the protocol under consideration is based on the non-polynomial complexity of the discrete logarithm problem in the ring of polynomials with integer coefficients.
Protocol of parameters and participants
The participants of the protocol are Alice A and a verifier V . Both participants know a number s, a polynomial Eis(X), and a polynomial F (X) from the group U (x). Alice knows a secret polynomial a(X) ∈ U (X) such that < F (x), a(x) > = 0 . According to the classical problem of a protocol authentication without disclosure, Alice should be able to prove to the verifier that she knows the secret polynomial a(X) without disclosing it. To verify that Alice knows the secret polynomial a(X), the verifier uses the polynomial A(X) : A(X) = a(x) s mod Eis(X).
The protocol choreography
• A must tell V the polynomial z(X) : s < z(X), F (X) > + < F (X), R(X) >= 0,
• A must tell V the polynomial y(X) : s < y(X), F (X) > + < F (X), R(X)A(X) >= 0.
4. To answer the first question, A uses the knowledge of the random polynomial r(X) and forms the polynomial z(X) = r(X); to answer the second question, A uses the knowledge of the secret polynomial a(X) and calculates the polynomial y(X) = r(X)a(X) mod Eis(X).
5. V makes sure that the answer of A is correct:
• for the answer to the first question, s < z(X), F (X) > + < F (X), R(X) > = s < r(X), F (X) > +s < F (X), r(X) >= 0
• for the answer to the second question, s < y(X), F (X) > + < F (X), R(X)A(X) > = s < r(X)a(X), F (X) > +s < F (X), r(X)a(X) >= 0.
The steps listed above are performed until the verifier makes sure that Alice knows the secret polynomial a(X). All properties of the protocol correspond completely to the classical protocol of authentication without disclosure.
